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Abstract. Secret handshake is a useful primitive that allows a group of
authorized users to establish a shared secret key and authenticate each
other anonymously. It naturally provides a certain degree of user privacy
and deniability which are also desirable for some private conversations
that require secure key establishment. The inherent user privacy enables
a private conversation between authorized users without revealing their
real identities. While deniability allows authorized users to later deny
their participating in conversations. However, deniability of secret hand-
shakes lacks a comprehensive treatment in the literature. In this paper,
we investigate the deniability of existing secret handshakes. We propose
the ﬁrst generic framework that converts any secret handshake proto-
cols into fully deniable ones. In particular, we deﬁne two formal security
models, including session key security and deniability for our proposed
framework.
Keywords: Secret handshake · Deniability · Generic framework
1 Introduction
The notion of secret handshake (SH) was ﬁrstly introduced by Balfanz et al. [1],
and has been extensively studied afterwards. Speciﬁcally, it allows authorized
users of the same organization to establish a shared secret key in an anonymous
manner. To ensure a successful handshake, authorized users need to prove his/her
membership to its peer. The only information they need to know is the peer
belongs to the same organization.
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While anonymity implicitly holds in the secret handshakes setting, other
properties are also desirable, such as aﬃliation-hiding [9], unlinkability [11] and
user untraceability [16]. The aﬃliation-hiding secret handshake is a stronger pri-
vacy guarantee than conventional SH, which means non-authorized users cannot
identify the membership of authorized users from their handshake sessions or
computed session keys. Unlinkable secret handshakes are intuitively more desir-
able than linkable ones, which means multiple sessions with the same user cannot
be linked together. However, it is a challenging task to construct an unlinkable
secret handshakes with eﬃcient and practical revocation mechanism (e.g., lin-
ear computation complexity in the number of revoked users at [11]). We stress
that linkable constructions can easily provide eﬃcient revocation mechanism
using pseudonym/certiﬁcate revocation list. As for user untraceability, it allows
authorized users to remain untraceable during private conversations with respect
to the untrusted issuing authority.
Motivation. In addition to aforementioned privacy properties, the secret hand-
shakes can further be explored in the context of “oﬀ the record” (OTR). We
allow session participants to later deny participating in a private conversation,
while anonymous authentication between handshake users is still held. We stress
that such deniable communications are particularly important to private conver-
sations in practice. For example, private conversations among handshake users
may under mass surveillance by intelligence services, and personal or business
communications may be revealed or leaked.
The existing deniable key exchanges allow session participants to plausibly
deny their participating in conversations, even if the security of communications
is later compromised [5,21]. In particular, deniability is the most important prop-
erty in secure messaging protocols such as Oﬀ-the-Record Messaging protocol
[2]. In other words, deniability is particularly useful to some applications that
require secure and private channels without producing cryptographic evidence of
communication. Therefore, the main goal of this work is to design secret hand-
shakes with maximal range of deniability while the existing privacy guarantees
are preserved.
Deniable secret handshake cannot be simply constructed by implementing
the existing fully deniable authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols. Full
deniability means that anyone can produce protocol transcripts and session keys
that look valid to a trusted party (judge). In particular, the fully deniable AKE
requires the resulting shared key is merely generated from Diﬃe-Hellman (DH)
exponents [23,24]. With regard to secret handshakes, authorized users may use
their given secret certiﬁcate to derive a shared secret key. The fully deniable
secret handshakes allow any authorized users (even issuing authority) of the same
organization to produce those protocol transcripts and session keys. Therefore,
the maximal range of deniable secret handshakes limits to a group of authorized
users in the same organization.
In this work, we introduce the notion of deniable secret handshake (DSH in
short), and we brieﬂy summarize our main contributions as follows: (1) The pro-
posed generic framework can convert any secret handshakes into fully deniable
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ones; (2) The handshake users can plausibly deny their participating in secure
and private conversations, even if the security of their conversations are com-
pletely compromised later; (3) We provide two security models for our proposed
generic framework, which is used to capture the security and privacy require-
ments of deniable secret handshakes.
1.1 Related Work
Secret Handshakes. The secret handshake protocol proposed by Balfanz et al.
[1] allows any users in the same group to generate a shared value secretly using
the reusable (i.e., long-term) certiﬁcate approach. Afterwards, Castelluccia et al.
[4] constructed a more eﬃcient scheme than [1] under the standard assumptions.
However, their schemes [1,4] did not provide the “unlinkability” property. In
[22], Xu and Yung provided an unlinkable scheme with a new notion, namely,
k-unlinkability. That is, an adversary can infer that a session participant is one
out of certain k users in the worst case.
As for achieving full unlinkability, Jarecki et al. [9] proposed two group secret
handshake protocols using the Burmester and Desmedt (BD) group key exchange
protocol [3]. In particular, their second construction can achieve full unlinkabil-
ity using unlimited one-time certiﬁcate. Meanwhile, another research line was
formed in the literature [7,8]. Their solutions can also achieve full unlinkability
using long-time certiﬁcate. However, their proposed solutions [7,8] lack revo-
cation mechanism, which is necessary and imperative in the secret handshake
setting. Recently, Tian et al. [20] proposed a k-time unlinkable secret handshake
protocol. Speciﬁcally, the proposed solution achieves full unlinkability based on
a k-size one-time certiﬁcates set, but the central authority (CA, also known as
group authority GA) is fully trusted.
To relax the strong assumption on CA, Kawai et al. [14] split the CA into
(non-colluding) authorities: one is responsible for registration and issuing certiﬁ-
cates, while the other is responsible for tracing users based on protocol transcript.
Meanwhile, Manulis et al. [16] considered user’s traceability against untrusted
CA. Their solution is based on the construction in [10], and uses blinded RSA
signature schemes at Add stage for tackling untrusted CA. Similarly, Manulis et
al. [17] also proposed a Discrete-Logarithm based secret handshake, and used
blinded Schnorr signature to tackle untrusted CA.
Deniable Key Exchange. Deniable authentication was formally introduced
by Dwork et al. [6] using the simulation-based paradigm. It requires that the
transmitted messages are authenticated, and the simulator’s view can be simu-
lated using adversary’s knowledge only. Later, Di Raimondo et al. [5] considered
deniability of key exchange protocols, and formally presented two deﬁnitions:
strong deniability and partial deniability. In particular, they used novel tech-
niques to analyze strong deniability of SKEME and partial deniability of SIGMA
respectively. More precisely, they prove strong deniability of SKEME based on
the plaintext awareness of the underlying encryption scheme, and prove partial
deniability of SIGMA based on a special “oracle” since non-repudiable digital
signature schemes are explicitly used for authentication.
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Jiang and Safavi-Naini [12] proposed an eﬃcient key exchange protocol with
full deniability, such that anyone can prove to a judge that the communica-
tion between two participants happened. Their deniable key exchange protocol
is formally proven secure in the public random oracle (pRO)1. A similar deni-
able work was proposed by Yao and Zhao [24]. They proposed the ﬁrst provably
secure internet key exchange protocol that provides strong deniability for pro-
tocol participants simultaneously. In particular, their deniability analysis relies
on the restricted random oracle model2 and (concurrent) knowledge of exponent
assumption (KEA).
Also, implicitly AKE protocols [15,19,23] formed another important research
direction in the literature. They not only enjoy high performance, but also
ensure strong deniability. The strong sense of deniability (e.g., [19,21]) means
that adversary acts as one of protocol participants (see Deﬁnition 2 for detailed
comparison between strong and full deniability).
2 Security Model
In this section, we present the security models for secret handshakes. Note that
the secret handshake protocol in this work should (at least) achieve session key
security and deniability. The linkable aﬃliation-hiding (LAH) and untraceability
models are directly from [10,16] respectively.
States. We deﬁne a system user set U with n users, i.e. |U| = n. We say an
oracle ΠiU may be used or unused. The oracle is considered as unused if it has
never been initialized. Each unused oracle ΠiU can be initialized with a secret
key x. The oracle is initialized as soon as it becomes part of a group. After
the initialization the oracle is marked as used and turns into the stand-by state
where it waits for an invocation to execute a protocol operation. Upon receiving
such invocation the oracle ΠiU learns its partner identiﬁer pid
i
U and turns into
a processing state where it sends, receives and processes messages according to
the description of the protocol. During that stage, the internal state information
stateiU is maintained by the oracle. The oracle Π
i
U remains in the processing state
until it collects enough information to compute the session key KiU . As soon as
KiU is computed Π
i
U accepts and terminates the protocol execution meaning
that it would not send or receive further messages. If the protocol execution fails
then ΠiU terminates without having accepted.
Partnering. We denote the i-th session established by a user U by ΠiU , and
pseudonyms of all the users recognized by ΠiU during the execution of that session
by pidiU . We deﬁne sid
i
U as the unique session identiﬁer belonging to the session
i established by the user U . Speciﬁcally, sidiU = {mj}nj=1, where mj ∈ {0, 1}∗ is
the message transcript among users. We say two instance oracles ΠiU and Π
j
U ′
are partners if and only if pidiU = pid
j





1 pRO is introduced by Pass [18], and it is a weaker assumption compared to random
oracle model.
2 It analogous to Pass’s non-programmable random oracle methodology pRO, see
detailed comparison in [25].
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2.1 System Model
A deniable secret handshake (DSH) protocol consists of the following algorithms:
– Setup: The algorithm takes security parameter λ as input, outputs public
parameters params.
– KeyGen: CA takes public parameter param as input, outputs public/secret
key pair (mpk, msk) of group G, and an empty pseudonym revocation list L.
– Add: This is an interactive algorithm between a user and CA. It takes group
secret key msk as input, outputs a pseudonym/certiﬁcate pair (pk, cert),
where pk denotes public pseudonym and cert denotes secret certiﬁcate. The
user will become a registered user after interaction with CA. Note that the
interaction between CA and users is assumed to be authentic, and CA main-
tains a group pseudonym list L by adding public pseudonym pk.
– Revoke: This algorithm is executed by CA of group G and results in the
update of the pseudonym revocation list L.
– Handshake: This is an interactive algorithm among registered users. Each
user takes his/her certiﬁcate (pk, cert), mpk and L as input, outputs a shared
secret key SK if and only if his/her counterparts are non-revoked and regis-
tered users.
2.2 Session Key Security
We deﬁne the session key security model for DSH protocols, in which each user
obtains secret certiﬁcate from group CA, and establishes a session key using the
given secret certiﬁcate. The model is deﬁned via a game between a probabilistic
polynomial time (PPT) adversary A and a simulator S (i.e., challenger). A is an
active attacker with full control of the communications channel among all the
users.
– Setup: S ﬁrst generates group public/secret key pair (mpkj , mskj) (j ∈
[1, · · ·m]) for m groups in the system. In addition, S generates the pub-
lic pseudonym and secret certiﬁcate (pki/cert
j
i ) (i ∈ [1, · · ·n]) for n users
in a group Gj by running the corresponding Add algorithm, and returns
{mpkj , pki} to A. S also tosses a random coin b which will be used later in
the game. Let U denote all the registered and non-revoked users in group Gj .
– Training: A can make the following queries in arbitrary sequence to S.
• establish: A is allowed to register a user U ′ with public pseudonym pk ∈
Gj . If a user is registered by A, then we call this user dishonest ; Otherwise,
it is honest.
• send: If A issues send query in the form of (Ui,Gj , s,m) to simulate a
network message for the s-th session of user Ui in group Gj , then S would
simulate the reaction of instance oracle ΠsUi upon receiving message m,
and returns to A the response that ΠsUi would generate; If A issues send
query in the form of (Ui,Gj , s, ‘start’), then S creates a new instance
oracle ΠsUi and returns to A the ﬁrst protocol message.
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• ephemeral secret key reveal: If A issues an ephemeral secret key reveal
query to (possibly unaccepted) instance oracle ΠsUi , then S will return
all ephemeral secret values contained in ΠsUi at the moment the query is
asked.
• long-term secret key reveal: If A issues a long-term secret key reveal (or
corrupt, for short) query to user i, then S will return the secret certiﬁcate
certji to A.
• group secret key reveal: If A issues a group secret key reveal query w.r.t.
Gj , then S will return the group secret key mskj to A.
• session key reveal: A can issue reveal query to an accepted instance oracle
ΠsUi . If the session is accepted, then S will return the session key to A;
Otherwise, a special symbol ‘⊥’ is returned to A.
• test: This query can only be made to an accepted and fresh (as deﬁned
below) session i of a user U (U ∈ U) in group Gj . Then S does the
following:
∗ If the coin b = 1, S returns the real session key to A;
∗ Otherwise, a random session key is drawn from the session key space
and returns to A.
It is also worth noting that A can continue to issue other queries after
the test query. However, the test session must maintain fresh throughout
the entire game.
Finally, A outputs b′ as its guess for b. If b′ = b, then S outputs 1; Otherwise,
S outputs 0.
Freshness. We say an accepted instance oracle ΠiU in group Gj is fresh if A
does not perform any of the following actions during the game:
– A issues establish query, where the new user U ′ ∈ pidiU ;
– A issues session key reveal query to ΠiU or its accepted partnered instance
oracle ΠjU ′ ;
– A issues both long-term secret key reveal query to U ′ s.t. U ′ ∈ pidiU and
ephemeral secret key reveal query for an instance ΠjU ′ partnered with Π
i
U ;
– A issues long-term secret key reveal query to user U ′ s.t. U ′ ∈ pidiU prior to the




Note that group secret key reveal query to CA is equivalent to the long-term
secret key reveal to all registered users in group Gj . We deﬁne the advantage
of A in the above game as
AdvA(λ, n,m) = |Pr[S → 1] − 1/2|. (1)
Definition 1. We say a DSH protocol has session key security if for any PPT
A, AdvA(λ, n,m) is a negligible function of the security parameter λ.
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2.3 Deniability
Informally, an adversary aims to present a “proof” to a third party judge, claim
that any non-revoked and authorized users of the same organization were par-
ticipated in a conversation. We formally deﬁne the deniability model for secret
handshake protocols as follows.
Definition 2. Let Σ be a secret handshake protocol deﬁned by a key genera-
tion algorithm KeyGen and interactive machines ΣI , ΣR specifying the role of
the initiator and responder respectively. We say that (KeyGen, ΣI , ΣR) is a con-
currently deniable SH protocol w.r.t the class Aux3 of auxiliary inputs if for any
PPT A, for any input of public pseudonym pk = (pk1, · · · , pkn), group public
keys mpk = (mpk1, · · · , mpkn) and any auxiliary input aux ∈ Aux, there exists
a simulator S who runs the same inputs as A4, aims to produce a simulated
view which is indistinguishable from the real view of A. That is, considering
the following two probability distributions where pk = (pk1, · · · , pkn) is the set
of public pseudonym of honest users and mpk = (mpk1, · · · , mpkn) is the set of
honest group public keys:
Real(λ, aux) = [(certi, pki, mskj , mpkj)
← KeyGen(λ, n,m); (aux, pk, mpk,View(aux, pk,mpk))]
Sim(λ, aux) = [(certi, pki, mskj , mpkj)
← KeyGen(λ, n,m); (aux, pk, mpk, S (aux, pk,mpk))]
then for all PPT distinguishers Dist and all aux ∈ Aux, we have
|Prx∈Real(λ,aux)[Dist(x)] = 1 − Prx∈Sim(λ,aux)[Dist(x)] = 1| ≤ (λ) (2)
where  is a negligible function of the security parameter λ. In particular, the
actions of distinguisher Dist after protocol executions are described as follows:
– The Dist is given the full protocol transcripts and accepted session keys in
which A participated.
– The Dist is allowed to obtain the secret certiﬁcates of all participants and the
corresponding master secret key in speciﬁc group G.
Remark. In the sense of full deniability, the View(aux, pk,mpk) means that A’s
view when honest users are faithfully performing secret handshake protocols in
group G, while S(aux, pk,mpk) means that the simulator S produces an indis-
tinguishable view to A without honest user’s certiﬁcates and CA’s master secret
key. As for the strong sense of deniability, where A acts as one of protocol partic-
ipants in group G. The View(aux, pk,mpk) means that A maliciously performs
3 Aux may consist of legal transcripts of protocol runs.
4 A is not allowed to reveal honest user’s secret certiﬁcates {certji} and group secret
keys {mskj}.
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secret handshakes with other honest users in a real view. While S(aux, pk,mpk)
means that the simulator S, who is running on the same inputs as A (includ-
ing A’s secret certiﬁcates and randomness), simulates an indistinguishable view
from a real view to a judge.
3 Our Construction
In this section, we ﬁrstly review some complexity assumptions and the building
blocks that will be used in our proposed generic framework. We then present our
construction afterwards.
3.1 Preliminaries
Secret Handshake (SH). A forward-secure secret handshake protocol consists
of the following algorithms: SH= (Setup, KeyGen, Add, Revoke, Handshake).
– Setup: The algorithm takes security parameter λ as input, outputs public
parameters params.
– KeyGen: CA takes security parameter param as input, outputs public/secret
key pair (mpkl, mskl) of group Gl, and an empty certiﬁcate revocation list Ll.
– Add: CA takes secret key mskl and user Ui ∈ U as input, outputs a certiﬁcate
certi for user Ui.
– Revoke: CA takes user Ui as input, retrieves the corresponding certi, and
updates the group revocation list Ll by adding this certiﬁcate certi.
– Handshake: This is an interactive algorithm between two users, e.g. Ui and Uj .
The input of user Ui (resp., Uj) is a tuple (certi, mpkl, Ll, rolei), where certi is
Ui’s certiﬁcate in that group, mpkl is the public key of the group with which
Ui wants to establish an authenticated connection, Ll is Ui’s current Ll for
this group and rolei ∈ {init, resp} (resp., (certj , mpkj , Lj , rolej)). Each party
either outputs a shared key K or reject otherwise. Note that the interactive
Handshake algorithm generally consists of the following sub-algorithms.
• Handshake.Ephemeral: User i outputs an ephemeral secret/public key pair
(eski, epki);
• Handshake.KE: Users exchange their ephemeral public keys, i.e., epki and
epkj ;
• Handshake.KDF: User i executes a key derivation function and obtains
K = KDF : (eski, epkj , certi, mpkl, Li, rolei) (j = i).
We discover that many existing secret handshake protocols (either RSA based or
Discrete-Logarithm based constructions [7–10,16,17]) can support strong deni-
ability, then we have the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Forward-secure SH protocols have inherent strong deniability.
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Proof. For simplicity, we assume a SH protocol executed between Alice and Bob
where Alice sends ephemeral public key epkA to Bob, and vice versa for Bob.
We assume that Alice and Bob aim to establish a shared key K ← (eskA,
epkB , certA, mpk, L, role) in a real view. Note that two simulated values are pre-
sented to a distinguisher: the exchanged ephemeral public keys and the resulting
shared keys.
The exchanged ephemeral public key pair (epkA, epkB) derives from either
the ephemeral secret key pair (eskA, eskB) or the function f(eskA, certA),
f(eskB , certB) (f denotes a randomized function, such as hash function or pseu-
dorandom function). Simulator S (i.e., adversary Bob) is simply choosing a ran-
dom value epkA from ephemeral public space to simulate transmitted ephemeral
public key on behalf of Alice, while the judge cannot statistically distinguish it
since the real/simulated value is uniformly distributed in either ephemeral pub-
lic key space or the output of function f (except collisions with a negligible
probability);
The resulting shared key K, can be easily simulated by simulator S. Specif-
ically, S (i.e., adversary Bob) randomly chooses ephemeral public key epkB
and computes K ← (epkA, eskB , certB , mpk, L, role), where ephemeral secret
key eskB and secret certiﬁcate certB are known to S. Note that the correct-
ness of resulting shared keys require Alice and Bob also exchange their pub-
lic pseudonyms (pkA, pkB) which is deriving from respective secret certiﬁcates
(certA, certB). 
Definition 3 (Generic Concurrent Knowledge Extraction Assumption
(GCKEA)). We deﬁne a domain {Domλ}λ∈N, where N is the set of natural
numbers, and deﬁne a set D R←− Domλ. We denote p(λ), q(λ) are two polynomi-
als in the security parameter λ, and deﬁne a predicate algorithm OC w.r.t the
random challenge set C = {C1, · · · , Cp(λ)}. On a query of the form (X,Y,Z),
for arbitrary (X,Y ) R←− D outputs 1 if X R←− C and Z = PKDF(X,Y )5. We
deﬁne an algorithm A with predicate oracle OC, denote AOC , which takes C
as input, outputs a set of triples {(X1, Y1, Z1), · · · , (Xq(λ), Yq(λ), Zq(λ))}. We
say AOC is a GCKEA extractor if, with overwhelming probability, AOC (C)
outputs {(X1, Y1, Z1), · · · , (Xq(λ), Yq(λ), Zq(λ))} satisfying Xi ∈ C and Zi =
PKDF(Xi, Yi) for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ q(λ).
We say that the GCKEA holds if for every PPT algorithm A, there exists
another PPT algorithm A′ that given the same inputs, random coins, oracle
answers, and additionally outputs yi such that Yi ← G(yi) for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ q(λ),
where G denotes an eﬃcient computable function which takes yi as input and
outputs Yi.
Remark. GCKEA is a generalized version of Concurrent KEA (CKEA) [24]
and Knowledge of Pairing Pre-Image Assumption (KPA) [19]. Speciﬁcally, the
extracted value yi by extractor A′ is either exponent w.r.t. CKEA assumption
[24] or group element w.r.t. KPA assumption [19]. For example, the concrete
5 The PKDF algorithm means that a key derivation function in the public-key setting.
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CKEA assumption [24] is used to extract the DH exponent for their proposed
interactive protocol, while running against the concurrent man-in-the-middle
adversaries.
3.2 Proposed Framework
Our proposed generic framework (GF) consists of the following building blocks.
– A forward-secure secret handshake protocol SH= (Setup, KeyGen, Add,
Revoke, Handshake); Note that SH protocol may have LAH property.
– A blind digital signature scheme BS= (KeyGen, Signer and User, Verify); Note
that if SH has untracebility property, then this building block is removed.
– A public key based key derivation function PKDF;
– A proof of knowledge PoK;
– A collision-resistant hash function H.
Now we present our proposed generic framework below (for simplicity, we use
user Â and user B̂ in the two-party setting here, and we can extend it to a
multi-party setting using BD protocol [3]):
– Setup: This algorithm takes security parameter λ as input, outputs public
parameters params ← SH.Setup which are published to all users and groups.
– KeyGen: The group CA runs the SH.KeyGen algorithm to obtain the group
public/secret key pair (mpk, msk) and an empty pseudonym revocation list L.
– Add: The group CA and user Â run the BS.Signer and User(msk) interactive
algorithm6 to obtain a pseudonym/certiﬁcate pair (pka, certa) of user Â.
Note that user Â takes pka as public pseudonym.
– Revoke: The group CA runs the SH.Revoke(pka) algorithm to update the
group pseudonym revocation list L. Note that public pseudonym pka is added
to revocation list L.
– Handshake:
• User Â runs the SH.Handshake.Ephemeral algorithm to obtain ephemeral
secret/public key pair (eska, epka) and sends (epka, pka) to user B̂;
• Upon receiving (epka, pka) from user Â, user B̂ performs the following
steps.
1. Run the SH.Handshake.Ephemeral algorithm to obtain ephemeral
secret and public key pair (eskb, epkb);
2. Compute the proof of knowledge PoK{(eskb) : H(PKDF(epkb, epka))};
3. Send (epkb, pkb,PoK(eskb)) to user Â.
• Upon receiving (epkb, pkb,PoK(eskb)) from user B̂, user Â computes
the proof of knowledge (i.e., non-malleable zero-knowledge) PoK{(eska,
certa) : H(PKDF(epka, epkb)||PKDF(pka, epkb))} and sends it to user B̂.
Meanwhile, Â computes the ﬁnal session key SKa = H(Ka||sid), where
Ka = SH.Handshake.KDF(eska, epkb, certa, mpk, L, init) and the session
identiﬁer is sid = (epka||epkb).
6 Refer to [13] for detailed Signer and User algorithm of BS scheme.
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• Upon receiving PoK(eska, certa) from user Â, user B̂ computes the
proof of knowledge PoK{(eskb, certb) : H(PKDF(epkb, epka)||PKDF
(pkb, epka))} and sends it to user Â. Meanwhile, B̂ computes the ﬁnal
session key SKb = H(Kb||sid), where Kb = SH.Handshake.KDF(eskb,
epka, certb, mpk, L, resp). Note that the equation Ka = Kb holds due to
the correctness of SH.Handshake algorithm.
3.3 Security Analysis
Theorem 1. The proposed generic framework achieves session key security
(Deﬁnition 1) in the random oracle model if the underlying SH is session key
secure.
Proof Sketch. Due to page limitation, the detailed security proof and the
subsequent proof are deferred to the full version of this work. We here only
present the proof sketch. We deﬁne a sequence of games Gi, i = 0, · · · , 4 for
session key security and analyze the advantage of the adversary in game Gi.
The ﬁrst game G0 is original game for session key security. The second game
G1 is used to capture replay attacks, such that no PPT adversary can ﬁnd the
collision of hash function H if users follow the framework execution honestly.
In game G2, we assume that the adversary must choose the speciﬁc session for
test query, which is speciﬁed by the simulator. In game G3, we assume that if
adversary can distinguish game G2 and G3 (the real SH session key is replaced
by a random value), then we can built an attacker to break the session key
security of underlying SH protocol. In the last game G4, the ﬁnal session key in
the test session is replaced by a random value. No PPT adversary can distinguish
this change since we model H as a random oracle. Therefore, the advantage of
adversary in this game is zero.
Theorem 2. The proposed generic framework achieves full deniability in the
sense of Deﬁnition 2.
The full deniability proof is similar to the proof of deniability described in [24].
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a generic framework for deniable secret handshake
protocols. We deﬁned the formal security models for session key security and
deniability of secret handshake protocols, and proved the security of the pro-
posed generic framework is secure under standard assumptions. We leave the
construction of an eﬃcient and fully deniable instantiation as our future work.
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